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Issue
Has Barnes failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
imposing a unified sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed, upon his guilty plea to felony
DUI, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence?

Barnes Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
While on parole for felony DUI, Barnes drove to the 127 Club and consumed “12 mixed
drinks,” then left the club and drove a short distance before he was “‘pulled over because [his]
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car did not have license plates.’” (PSI, pp.3-5, 14. 1) Officers noted that Barnes smelled of
alcohol and his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. (PSI, p.3.) Barnes failed field sobriety tests and
breath testing revealed that his BrAC was .161/.147. (PSI, p.3.)
The state charged Barnes with felony DUI (prior felony DUI conviction within 15 years).
(R., pp.31-32.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Barnes pled guilty to felony DUI (prior felony
DUI conviction within 15 years); the state agreed to recommend a unified sentence of 10 years,
with two years fixed; and the defense was “free to argue for less.” (R., p.36.) The district court
imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.50-53.) Barnes filed a
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.54-56.) He also filed a timely
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (Rule 35 Motion to
Modify Judgment; Order Denying Rule 35 Motion to Modify Judgment (Augmentations).)
Barnes asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his “focus on treating his alcohol
abuse,” plan to return to sober housing, participation in church activities, and because he “had a
good relationship with his three adult children.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.) The record supports
the sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
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limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for felony DUI (prior felony DUI conviction within 15
years) is 10 years. I.C. § 18-8005(6), -8005(9). The district court imposed a unified sentence of
10 years, with two years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.50-53.)
On appeal, Barnes contends that his sentence is excessive because he “was ready to stop drinking
and begin an alcohol treatment program” and he wished to participate in Veteran’s Court.
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.) However, Barnes has previously declared his desire to stop drinking and
participate in treatment, and he has also previously participated in numerous alcohol abuse
treatment programs, including an eight-month residential treatment program at the Addiction
Recovery Center, inpatient treatment at the VA Hospital, outpatient treatment at the VA

3

Hospital, the Cognitive Behavior Intervention substance abuse program, intensive outpatient
treatment at St. Alphonsus, the ABC and/or CSC program, and AA/NA self-help group
meetings. (PSI, pp.16-17, 62, 89, 100, 178-79, 186-87, 197.) He nevertheless continued to make
the decision to endanger the community by driving while under the influence of alcohol,
incurring four DUI convictions in the past 10 years. (PSI, pp.4-5.) Barnes also argues that his
sentence is excessive because he participated in church activities regularly, “had a good
relationship with his three adult children,” planned to return to sober housing through Rising
Sun, and intended to apply for VA housing. (Appellant’s brief, p.4.) Again, Barnes previously
had a good relationship with his three adult children, participated in church activities on a regular
basis, resided in Rising Sun sober housing, and applied for Veteran’s housing, yet none of these
things precluded him from continuing to drive while intoxicated. (PSI, pp.7, 64-65, 68, 183-84.)
At sentencing, the state addressed Barnes’ ongoing decisions to endanger the community
by driving while under the influence of alcohol, his repeated violations of the terms of probation
and parole, his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite multiple prior treatment opportunities
and legal sanctions, and the need to protect the community from his dangerous criminal
behavior. (Tr., p.26, L.13 – p.30, L.7 (Appendix A).) The district court subsequently articulated
the correct legal standards applicable to its decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing
Barnes’ sentence and declining to place him in Veteran’s Court. (Tr., p.35, L.14 – p.40, L.14
(Appendix B).) The state submits that Barnes has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for
reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpts of the sentencing hearing transcript, which
the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendices A and B.)
Barnes next asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion
for a reduction of sentence in light of his housing placement, attendance at AA meetings,
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continued desire to participate in Veteran’s Court, renewed claim that he was “finally” ready to
“get sober,” and reiteration that he had a period of sobriety following his service in the Navy and
was active in his children’s lives and in the community. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.) If a
sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is
a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Barnes
must “show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Barnes has failed to satisfy
his burden.
Barnes provided no new information in support of his Rule 35 motion. Information with
respect to Barnes’ attendance at AA meetings, desire to “get sober” and to participate in
Veteran’s Court, prior 23-year period of sobriety, and participation in community and church
activities (including the scouting program) was before the district court at the time of sentencing;
as such, none of this was “new” information. (PSI, pp.3, 6, 9-10, 14, 16, 68, 94, 178-79, 181,
183, 186-87; Tr., p.35, Ls.2-8.) Barnes’ placement in a work facility was likewise not “new”
information that supports a reduction of sentence, as the placement of inmates lies within the
discretion of the Idaho Department of Correction; nor was the fact that he was again working at
B and D Foods “new information,” as Barnes expressed, during his presentence interview, that
he would like to “return to employment through B and D Foods upon his release from custody.”
(PSI, p.8.)

Furthermore, in its order denying Barnes’ Rule 35 motion, the district court

determined that Barnes’ motion “does not provide any substantially new information that was
not already provided at sentencing.” (Order Denying Rule 35 Motion to Modify Judgment, p.3
(Augmentation).) Because Barnes presented no new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion,
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he failed to demonstrate in the motion that his sentence was excessive. Having failed to make
such a showing, he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s order
denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Barnes’ conviction and sentence and
the district court’s order denying Barnes’ Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

DATED this 24th day of July, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24th day of July, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.
__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

6

APPENDIX A

26

25
1
2

So I don't know why it's in the system.
It's on page two.
THE COURT: All right . Let's just indicate

3

1
2

MR. STEWART: No, Your Honor.

3

THE COURT: Does either party plan to

MR. WHITE: No, Your Honor.
present any evidence or t estimony today?

4

on page two the defendant denies ever using an alias

4

5
6

Social Security number.
MR. STEWART: Thank you, judge. Nothing

5
6

MR. STEWART: No.

7

more.

7

THE COURT : We don't have any restitution

8
9

THE COURT: Anything else then?
MR. STEWART: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

10
11

8

9

issues, do we?
MR. WHITE: No, Your Honor .

10

THE COURT: Mr. Whi te, you've read and

11

reviewed the sentencing materials?

12

MR. WHITE: I have.

12

13

THE COURT: Any errors or corrections that

13

14

MR. WHITE: Argument only.

you noticed?

THE COURT: All right. Then we'll hear
arguments and recom mendations from t he State first.
Mr. Wh ite, you have the floor.
MR. WHITE: Thank you, Your Honor. Your

14

Honor, in t his case I'm going to ask that you follow the

point ou t that the reason t hat that information is in the

15
16

plea agreement, enter a judgment of conviction, the

16
17

PSI is because that alias and t he alternate Social

17

ask the court impose that sentence.

18

Security number is listed in his NCIC as something he

18

19
20

used.

19

to be appropriate for Veteran's Treatment Court. The

20

21

error, could be something more substantial. I don't think

21

State respectfully disagrees with that conclusion.
Mr. Barnes has the prior felony DUI

22

it makes any difference to the proceedings here today.

22
23
24
25

MR. WHITE: No, Your Honor. I would just

15

THE COURT: Well, it could be a clerical

23

All right. Does either party believe we

24

need any additional investigations or evaluations before

25

proceeding?

ten-year sentence; two fixed, eight indeterminant. I'll
I am aware that he was screened and deemed

conviction from 2009. From my review of his records
associated with that case, it appears at the time of his
original sentencing, he was required to complet e an
inpatient drug treatment program at Saint Alphonsus.
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK

CHRISTINE AN NE OLESEK

SRL-1044
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1

He violated his probation in 2012. At t hat

1

his continued use of alcohol is certa inly contributed. It

2

time he was required to complete an additional inpatient

2

is not, however, creating the legal situation that brings

3

drug and alcohol treatment program t his time through the

4

Veteran's Administ rat ion. He went to the State of Arizona

3
4

Mr. Barnes to court. And simply addressing t he alcohol
portion of thi ng s does not address the egregious t hinking

5
6

where he then committed the new felony offense t hat he got

5

errors that he is presenting when he is continually over

him sent to prison down there, and t hen had him come back

6

and over and over again making the conscious decision to

7

here upon his release. And then he was sent to prison

7

voluntarily intoxicate himself and t hen put himself on t he

8

again on the Idaho charg es on what was at that t ime now

8

road putting everyone else in danger.

9 Judge Norton's case.
1O
He was released on parole early last year

The facts of this particu lar case in large

9
10

respect are a grea t showing of how little Mr . •• little

11
12

regard Mr. Barnes has for the other folks on the road and

13
14

does .
not allowed to go to a bar. He's not allowed to drink

t his in terms of a treatment program of some kind, but the

15
16

alcohol. He didn't go there drunk. He wasn't taken there

17

State's view is also that we're taking a too narrow view

17

at gunpoint. He wasn't made to go. He made the voluntary

18

of this case if we were simply looking at as a substance

18

decision to go himself, and he apparently drove himself.

19
20

abuse problem.
If th is was simply a possession of

19
20

21

methamphetamine or some other kind of drug, that would be

21

22
23
24
25

somet hing that is simply a substance abuse problem. This
case. Th ere's no question that his continued insistence

22
23
24

on using alcohol is a problem and there's no question that

25

11

and by his own admission was very quickly back to using

12
13

alcohol. Accord ing to the presentence materials, it looks
like he estimated that he was spending approximately 75 to

14

$100 on alcohol a week. And, frankly, in the State's

15
16

view, he's had multiple treatment opportunities to address

is not t hat case. This is a driving under the influence

CHRISTINE AN NE OLESEK
SRL- 1044
03/06/2018 01:52:48 PM

how little he seems t o take the danger of cond uct t hat he
He went out to a bar; he's on parole. He's

Another t hing that I don't believe that he's allowed to do
whi le he's on parole for a felony DUI.
He went anyway. He chose to consume large
quantities of alcohol while making no plans to safely get
himself at home at all. He then walked right out of the
bar, straight back to his own car, and he got behind the
wheel again and drove again.
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL-1044

Page 25 to 28 of 42

APPENDIX A – Page 1

10 of 15 sheets

30

29

1
2 again this man has been arrested, accused, charged and
3 convicted for driving under t he influence. He's been out
4 on parole on our streets for a short period of t ime, and

Time and time and time and t ime and t ime

5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

he did it again.
Simply looking at this as, well, you've got
an alcohol problem, so we're going to figure out a way to
get you back on t he streets, so that we don't have to send
you back to prison is in the State's view the wrong way to
look at this.
What we are looking at at this point is a
need to protect the commun ity, and it is a need to protect
the community from Mr. Barnes. And if he is not by all of
his prior DUls understood that his conduct is dangerous
and that he cannot continue to voluntari ly intoxicate
himself and t hen get behind the wheel of a car, then it is
the State's belief that the appropriate place for him is
not to put him into a treatment program t hat is going to
allow him to stay out in the community so that he can
continue to drink, but in stead to put him back into a
prison cell where he can be removed from society for a
while so that at least during that t ime we know that
society is going to be protected and Mr. Barnes can
understand that when you continue to drink and drive,
we're not going to bend over backwards trying to find ways

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

to put you back in the community, you're going t o go back
to prison and you are going t o go back to prison for a
long time.
I understand the recommendation for
Veteran's Treatment Court from his parole officer. I
respectfully disagree with it. I believe that a prison
sentence is appropriate in t his case.
Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr . White.
Mr. Stewart.
MR. STEWART: Thank you, judge. Your Honor,
I disagree with the State. Vet eran's Court does address
substance abuse issues as well as criminal th inking errors
and behavior errors as well. And so he's going to be
closely monitored, which was - - and on a very short leash
in Veteran's Court if t he court grants him an opportunity
to do that.
I do agree that driving under t he influence
is a serious offense. Very dangerous to our society and
our community, and Mr. Barn es knows that as well. And
we're not disputing the fact t hat he chose to go to a ba r
and drink. His judgment with alcohol became more impaired
and he made bad choices after drinking, wh ich brought him
here. And he's not making any excuses, but what he is
asking the court to consider is that he's not getting any
CHRISTINE ANN E OLESEK
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

younger. Prison only serves mainly for the purpose of
punishment, not rehabilitation purposes.
I think with Veteran's Court participation,
with the close monitoring and the short leash that he will
be on will provide safety to our commun ity, will provide
transit ion into the community safely for Mr. Barnes and
for ou r commu nity.
If he sidesteps at oll, he expects fully t o

8

go to prison.
I believe that the Department of Corrections
and the Parole Commission agree that Veteran's Court wou ld
be beneficial not only to Mr. Barnes, but also to our
community. That's why they diverted the parole violation .
And so if he can get into this program and do well,
maintain contact with his probation/parole officer,
maintain sobriety, avoid from driving, and comply with all
the terms of probation, we won't see him back here again
in this type of situation.
So, Your Honor, he does have plans to go to
t he Risin g Sun until he can get into approved housing. He
has applied to the Garfield House for veterans and -which would be preferable to Rising Sun. And he still
hasn't received acceptance, but, of course, he'd have to
get approva l through his probation officer or Veteran 's
Court before moving into any of those housing units.
CHRISTINE ANN E OLESEK
SRL- 1044
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1 Sobriety housing units .
He really feels that this added mon itoring
2
3 and structure will help him to remai n sober. I completely
4 believe him. He's had some t ime now to be sober, to
5 reflect upon his life.
And t he -- one other t hing I wanted to bri ng
6
7 up is back at the preliminary hearing t here was a motion
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

and order to continue the preliminary hearing for
Mr. Barnes to look into Veteran's Court, and there was no
objection from the State. And I wanted to bri ng that up.
It's in the case itself on Odyssey.
And t hat's where we orig inally believed that
part of the agreement was that the State was not opposed
to Veteran's Court. So on October 2nd there was a
preliminary hearing notice minute sheet on fi le for t his
case. It was Judge McDaniel for Cawthon, and t he
prosecuting attorney was Ms. Ann Anderson.
MR. WHITE: Judge, I'm going to object to
t his. We had this discussion earlier. He asked me if we
had agreed to Veteran's Court. We got an E-mail from the
preliminary hearing attorney explaining there was never an
agreement for Veteran's Court. It was something that
defense asked for. We were never okay with that.
There was an e-mail conversation that both
myself and Mr. Stewart were party t o back in October that
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL-1 044
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33
explained that t hat was a P.D. req uest; it was not a State

34
MR. STEWART: Thank you, judge. The reason

1

2

agreement. And I want it made clear for the record, we
have never at any time agreed to Veteran's Court for t his

2
3

why I was bringing this up is because Mr. Barnes had it in

3
4

defendant.

4

be screened for Drug Cou rt and there was no objection from
the State. And it has been clarified here in t he District

5

5

And I object to continuing down this line of

his mind at the prel iminary hearing that he was going to

6

inquiry when t hat has been made very clear. Despite

6

Court that t hat -- t he State was not making an offer t hat

7

whatever somebody may have marked on a minute sheet, we

7

he do Veteran's Cou rt .

8

have never ag reed to Veteran 's Court. End of discussion.
TH E COURT: I th ink for t he record I'll

8

9

I was just bringing that up so that it's
clear on the record where we had a litt le bit of a

10

overrule the objection, but fundamentally t he defendant

10

quandary in t he negotiating process here. But ultimately

11

pied guilty with t he und ersta nding t hat t he State was

12

opposing Vetera n's Treatment Court and I think t hat
condition in and of itself essentially erases any other

11
12

Mr. Barnes did plead guilty, as the court stated, and
understood that t he State was opposed to Veteran's Court.

13

9

13

Nonetheless, Your Honor, I'm asking the
court -- and we're asking the court -- to g ive him th is
chance on Veteran's Court. He's been approved. The

14

16

prior statement, understanding, condition or whatever.
I n any event, ultimately the decision is up
to the court and he pied guilty fully acknowledging th;it

17

there were no prom ises or gu ara ntees as to the final

17

Department of Corrections recommends it. The Commission
of Parole and Probation -- or the Parole Commission also

18

sentence.

18

would like to see him in Vetera n's Court. And so with

14
15

21

22
23
24
25

16

19

that said, Your Honor, we ask t he court to follow the

meaningless argument; whether raised by the defense or
whether raised by the State because he pied guilty with a

20

recommendation of t he defense.
THE COURT: Mr. Barnes, you have the right

clear understanding that the State opposed Veteran's

22
23
24
25

19

20

15

So I t hink fu ndamental ly it's a relatively

Treatment Court and he also pied guilty wit h a clear
understanding that the defense could ask for it and t hat's
really as fa r as it goes in my mind.

21

to address the court before sentencing. So if there's
anyth ing you'd like to say, I'd be happy to hear it at
th is time.
THE DEFENDANT: Basically I go back and you
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK

CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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Secondly, a sentence that has the effect of

1
2

always want to give the resume of all the stuff we've
done. I got two decades of community service in civic and

1
2

deterring others from committing similar crimes and

3
4

religious organizations; I've done all t hat.
But for today, you know, I -- pla in and

3
4

deterring you from committing future crime.
Thirdly, a sentence that provides

5

simple, I do appreciate t he opportunity for being screened

5

rehabilitative opportunities when and where available and

6
7

for Veteran's Court. And if the court does deem t hat
that's appropriate, I will do whatever it takes to

6

appropriate.

8
9

successfu lly com plete that program. Than k you.
THE COURT: All right then. Is there any

8
9

objectives of punishment or ret ribution as needed. The
ultimate goal, Mr. Barnes, is to f ashion a sentence t hat

10
11

is just and fair and fits both the crime and t he criminal.
In deciding upon t he sentence, I can and do

MR. WHITE: No, Your Honor.

12

consider all the facts and circumstances of the crime and

MR. STEWART: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Barnes, based upon your

13

your prior criminal record . The plea bargain agreement.
Defendant's condition, character and attitude. The

10

legal cause why we shou ldn't proceed with the sentencing

11
12

at t his time?

13
14

And fi nally, a sentence t hat achieves the

7

14

15

guilty plea to t he charge of felony driving under the

15

16

influence as alleged in the information, the court does

16

information, m aterial and recommendations in the
presentence report. The va rious aggravating and

17
18

find you guilty as cha rged.
It thus becomes my duty to use my own best

17

m itigating factors. The arguments and recommendations of

18

judgment and the appropriate sentencing discretion that's
required by this office based upon the statutes enacted by

19

counsel, as well as your own statements.
Therefore, it is t he judgment of this court

our legislatu re and the cases decided by our courts.
There are four main objectives of criminal

21

19

20
21

22
23
24
25

sentencing I must and do consider, and the first and most
important of those objectives is to impose a sentence t hat
serves to protect society.
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL-1044
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20
22
23
24
25

that the following sentence will be imposed. The court
will enter a judgment of conviction for the cri me of
felony driving under the influ ence of alco hol as alleged
in t he information and impose a total sentence of ten
years imprisonment with the first two years fixed followed
by eight years indeterminant.
CHRISTIN E ANNE OLESEK
SRL-1044
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38

37

1
2
3

I will note the defendant has accrued credit
for t ime served of this date of 111 days. The sentence
wou ld be concurrent wi t h any other sentences that t he

1

he was drinking, but obviously made bad choices before he

2

was drinking. And it makes one wonder what is t he effect

3
4

of t he law if one can so cavalierly ignore it? What
message does it sent to societ y? What protection does it

5

defendant may have been serving. I will impose standard
court costs to incl ude $250 for Public Defender fees. I

5

offer to society? What message does it send to t his

6
7

will also impose a fine of $2,500.
The defendant has previously provided a

6
7

defendant?

8

sample of his DNA and right thumbprin t to my knowledge,

8

9

but if he hasn't, t hen I require t hat he comply with the

work before, maybe Veteran's Treatment Court will.
Counsel are aware t hat my general perception of these

4

9

11

Idaho DNA Database Act.
There are no counts to be dismissed; things

12
13
14

of that nature.
All right. So it really comes down to and
obviously the hard part of th is case and this question is

15

whether or not to suspend the sentence and give the
defendant Veteran's Treatment Court or whP.t her to impose

10

Again, on t he other side, if prison didn't

11

specialty courts is th at it's a special form of intense
probat ion, and to the extent that t hose who are currently

12

on regular probation or parole do not seem to get t he

10

13

level of su pervision that we would oftentimes prefer, that

14

the Drug Court, Vetera n's Treatment Court things do
provide that.

the sentence as req uested by t he State.
I believe that t here are strong arguments to

15
16
17
18

19

be made on both sides, and I ca n't say it's a particularly

19

20

easy decision to make. The -- part of the problem here is

20

an honorable discharge.
In all other respects he seems to have good

21

that prison obviously didn't work before; maybe Veteran's
Treatment Court will . On the other side, the defendant

21

physical health and good mental health. I appreciate that

22
23
24
25

appreciat e that the defendant has been screened and
approved for Veteran's Treatment Court. I also appreciate

16

17
18

22
23
24
25

was out on parole, drinking when he wasn't supposed to,
drinkin g and driving when he wasn't supposed to, going to
ba rs when he was n't supposed to, making bad choices after

I have all rega rd and respect for the fact
t hat t he defendant is a veteran of t he United States Navy ;
having served honorably from 1979 until 1986 and received

the defendant wants Veteran's Treatment Court. I

t hat this is hi s fourth lifetime DUI, and that he was on
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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1
2

parole from the 2009 DUI at t he t ime.
I guess in my mind what it boils down to at

1
2

offense. I see nothing that doesn't indicate t hat he's
still a risk to re-offend. I think it is necessa ry for

3

this point is I can't have it both ways and both ways

3

general deterrence and to send a proper message to

4

would be I wou ld want a sentence t hat would provide for at

4

least a significant level of incarceration, and t hen would
allow for t he intense probation/parole supervision --

5
6
7

society. I think it's also necessary for specific
deterrence to at least keep the defendant off t he streets

5

6
7

whatever you want to ca ll it -- upon his release. I think

8

for the t ime of his inca rceration.
In all other respects, Mr. Barnes, I'm sorry
that I cannot allow you to go t hrough th at the Veteran's

8

that a significant extent of incarceration is necessa ry

9
10

both for the protection of society, at least during the
t ime t hat the defendant is Incarcerated, and sends t he

9
10

11
12

proper message.
At t he same time, whether we give him one

11

on something akin to Drug Court, Vetera n's Court as a

12

13

year, two years, three years, five yea rs or ten years, at

13

condition of parole. I believe t hat under t he
circumstances that you should be eligible for t hat at that

14
15

some point he gets out and if he's going to use bad
judgment and continue to drink and drive at that point in

14

point in t ime.

16

time, what lesson have we taught him and what lesson have

15
16

have to have a driver's license suspension and the court

17
18

we taught to society?
With all respect and regard to t he defendant

17

19

and to both sides, the court is not going to suspend the
sentence in th is case. I'm not going to give the

19

20

privileges. We don't have to worry about interlock or
anyt hing of that nature. That will be effective from t he

defendant a chance at Veteran's Treatment Court. I'm
going to impose the underlying sentence. I believe that

21

t ime that he's released from custody of the Idaho

22
23
24
25

Department of Corrections.
So if he's released in two years, then it

20
21

22
23
24
25

it's necessary. I believe that it's reasonable, fa ir and
Just for the following reasons becau se the defendant's
condition has created a danger to society. It's a serious
CHRISTINE ANN E OLESEK
SRL-1044
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18

Treatment Court process. I do understand as a practical
matter that the Department of Corrections is now working

So in addition to that, the defendant does

will suspend t he def endant's driver's license for a pe riod
of five years. Absolutely all five years . No restricted

will be commencing from the t ime of hi s release .
All ri ght, Mr. Barnes. I wa nt to rem ind you
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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Page 37 to 40 of 42

APPENDIX B – Page 2

03/06/2018 01 :52:48 PM

